Data Appendix
Of the 22,000 villages in the island of Java, I am able to consistently match 14,569 across the 6 waves included in this study. Among these villages, 2,839 of them do not report consistent term lengths of the village head for years 1996, 2000, and 2003 and are dropped for the sample. In addition to this, 368 villages are dropped because of having missing information on the years of education of the village head, the length of tenure of the village head or the number of INPRES schools. Finally, 1,091 villages are dropped because of having more than 10,000 inhabitants (the average village has 3,378 inhabitants) or more than two INPRES schools constructed. The large size of these villages could influence some of the results. 416 of the remaining villages have an appointed village head (kelurahan villages) and are excluded from the main analysis. The resulting sample contains information on 9,855 villages. The baseline specifications in the paper focus on the period 1986-2003 when information of the education of the village head is available. There are 6 census waves in this period. Consequently, the number of village-year observations in the baseline specification is 59,130. In some regressions the number of observations is lower than this. This is due to the fact that some outcome variables are not reported in every wave of the census or by a few missing observations in the outcome variable for some years. When information missing for some years, I mention it in the table notes.
Construction of Variables
Years of Education of the Village Head: This variable is constructed as follows: no schooling = 0 years of schooling; not completed primary school = 2 years; primary school = 6 years; junior high school = 9 years; senior high school = 12 years; academy = 14 years; college = 16 years.
Village-level electoral calendar: The electoral calendar in each village is derived from the reported length of tenure of the village head in 1993. In particular, the year of the first election post-1992 is inferred using the following procedure.
• If the village head reports having been in office between 0 and 1 years in 1993, I know there was an election in that village between 1992 and 1993. I assume that election was the first election post-1992.
• If the village head reports having been in office for 2 or 10 years in 1993, I know there was an election in 1991. Since this election was prior to 1992, the first election after 1992 is scheduled to take place in 6 years. Hence, in 1999.
• If the village head reports having been in office for 3 or 11 years in 1993, I know there was an election in 1990. Since this election was prior to 1992, the first election after 1992 is scheduled to take place in 5 years. Hence, in 1998.
• Similarly for the rest of villages.
Measures of Public Goods:
• Primary Health Care Center: This outcome variable is a dummy that takes value one if the village has a polyclinic or a puskesmas. Puskesmas are primary health care centers in charge of basic medical services and preventive care. In polyclinics households can have access to more advanced medical treatments. Formally trained doctors and nurses work in both type of health facilities.
• Doctors in the village: This variable takes value one if at least one formally trained doctor lives and works in the village.
• Access to safe drinking water: This variable takes value one if most households in the village obtain their drinking water from a pump or from a water company. It takes value zero if households drink water from a natural well, from rain, river or other source.
• Number of Health Posts: This variable corresponds to the number of health posts or posyandu in the village. These are small community-based healthcare facilities that are responsible for family planning and maternal and child care.
• Garbage Disposal: This outcome variable takes value one if the village has a system of garbage disposal through the use of bins or by burying the waste into a hole. It takes value zero if households through their wast to the river or dispose their garbage through some other method.
Proxies for Demands of Public Goods:
• Villages are considered to have a low level of provision of public goods at baseline if in the year 1986 they do not have primary health centers in the village, there are no doctors living in the village, there is no access to purified water, and/or there is not a system of garbage bin disposal. Number of health posts is reported from 1990 onward and, hence, 1990 is considered the baseline year.
• Mortality. Appendix Table 22 uses the mortality rate at baseline as a predictor of the demand for health services. In particular high level of mortality is a dummy that takes value one if the number of deaths per capita in 1986 in the village is above the median number of deaths per capita in the sample.
The Effect of the Village Head Education on Public Goods Provision: 2SLS Estimates
The results presented in this paper suggest that the most likely mechanism behind the estimated increase in public good provision is the increase in the level of education of village heads. This mechanism is also consistent with the literature on Indonesian village context during the period. The high concentration of power in the figure of the village head during the Soeharto period, made the village head a key player in the management of village public goods (Evers (2000) , Antlöv (2003) ). In this subsection I implement an instrumental variables strategy where I use the interaction of the timing of elections and the intensity of the INPRES program to construct an instrument for the level of education of the village head. This strategy allows me to provide estimates of the returns to schooling of village heads in terms of the extra public good provision that they deliver. More formally, I estimate the following econometric model where equation (5) presents the structural equation of interest while equation (6) shows the first stage:
y vt = β 0 + β 1 educ vt + β 2 postel92 vt + α v + δ t + ε vt (5)
where educ vt is the number of years of education of the village head in office in year t in village v. The rest of variables are defined as before. As the specification shows, the interaction of the timing of the first election after 1992 and the number of INPRES schools is used as an instrument for the level of education of the village head.
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In order to explore whether more educated village heads increase the provision of those public goods in worse condition at baseline, I estimate the following econometric model.
where BadService v takes value 1 for villages that had bad quality of the public good y in the year 1986. Both the level of education of the village head and its the interaction with the bad service dummy are instrumented for, using specification (3) as first stage. Hence, the instrumental variables used in this specification are the dummy for the period after first election post-1992, postel92 vt , interacted with the number of INPRES schools, the post dummy interacted with bad service at baseline and the triple interaction of the three variables.
The validity of these instrumental variables strategies require that the following assumptions are satisfied:
1. Relevance: the instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressors.
2. Validity of the first stage: the timing of elections and its interaction terms are quasirandom.
3. Exclusion restriction: the interaction of the timing of the first election post-1992 with INPRES intensity and bad baseline service, conditional on controls, only affects public good provision through changing the level of education of the village head.
The evidence presented in Table 6 supports the validity of the first assumption: the first election after 1992 raises the level of education of village heads by 0.43 years of education, on average. Furthermore, the effect is higher for villages that experienced a more intense INPRES school construction program. Note that the R-squared of the relevant specification (column 2) is high, 0.58. Appendix Table 20 shows the first stage of the heterogeneous effects specification, which also shows substantial R-squares. To further support assumption 1, all the instrumental variables results provided in the paper present the F-statistic of the Cragg-Donald weak instruments test.
The results presented in Table 2 support the validity of the second assumption, since changes in a large number of covariates do not predict the timing of the elections. Furthermore, given that all specifications include village fixed effects, the interaction of the timing of elections with time-invariant factors-such as the number of INPRES schools or bad baseline at service-will also be uncorrelated to the error term of the first stage.
In section 5 of the paper, we provide a number of pieces of evidence that suggest that the main channel behind the estimated effects is the changes in the level of education of the village head. Hence, the assumption that the interactions of the timing of the first election post-1992 only affect outcomes by increasing the education of the village head is a plausible assumption. Nevertheless, in the next subsection, I discuss some potential threats to the exclusion restriction and I present a number of additional robustness checks.
Appendix Tables 18.A and 18 .B present the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS henceforth) and the Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS henceforth) results for the instrumental variables strategies described above. The first and the third column of each outcome variable present the OLS results. The second and fourth columns present the 2SLS results of specifications (5) and (7), respectively.
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The results on the estimation of equation (5) suggest that more educated village heads only lead to average increases in public goods for primary health care centers and garbage bin disposal systems. While the point estimates suggest that there are also increases in the other public goods, the results are less precisely estimated. This could be driven by the fact that effective leaders may focus on increasing the provision of those public goods that are in greater need or in worse condition. To further explore the hypothesis of heterogenous effects across villages, the third and the fourth column for each public good present the results where the level of education of the village head is interacted with a measure of bad quality of service at baseline. The results confirm the heterogeneous pattern of public good provision: more educated village heads increase the provision of those public goods that were in worse condition at baseline.
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Overall, the results suggest that more educated village heads lead to increases in those public goods for which there is a greater need. Although village head education does not seem to be the only factor in explaining the evolution of the provision of these goods, the increase in village head education can account for a sizable share of the increase.
2SLS Robustness Checks
In this section I present a number of robustness checks for the 2SLS results and discuss potential threats to the exclusion restriction.
A potential concern with the results presented in Appendix Tables 18.A and 18 .B is that the strength of the first stage is moderate: the Cragg-Donald statistic ranges between 0.36 and 8.4t. Appendix Table 21 implements an alternative instrumental variable strategy where the post first-election after 1992 dummy is also used as an instrumental variable-i.e., 55 The first stage corresponding to the second column is presented in Table 6 , column 2. The first stage corresponding the fourth column is presented in the appropriate column of Appendix Table 20 . 56 The OLS results are smaller in magnitude than the 2SLS results. This could be driven by a number of reasons. First, the number of years of education of village heads might be measured with error, which would generate attenuation bias in the OLS estimation. Second, the OLS might suffer from omitted variable bias. For instance, villages might suffer positive economic shocks (e.g. discovery of natural resources) that, all else equal, increase public good provision. If those same shocks weaken the a accountability relationship and allow ineffective low-educated leaders to stay for longer in power, the OLS would be downward biased. Results along these lines were found in Brollo et al. (2013) . Third, in the presence of heterogenous treatment effects, the 2SLS captures the effect of the education of village heads in those villages where the INPRES program induced them to replace their village leaders by more educated ones. This set of villages might be the ones with greater returns to the education of village heads, and hence, higher point estimates of the effect of education of the village head on public good provision.
I impose β 2 = 0 in equation (5). This additional instrument leads to stronger first stages, with Cragg-Donald statistics substantially higher. Both instrumental variable strategies lead to similar effects of the years of education of the village heads interacted with poor quality of service at baseline. Hence, it is unlikely that the main results are severely affected by weak instruments bias.
Appendix Table 23 presents additional robustness checks similar to those implemented on the reduced form specifications and presented in Table 5 . The results show that the results are robust to controlling for population, adding as controls the interaction of the pretreatment level of primary school enrolment in the village and year fixed effects, and adding as controls the pre-treatment value of the covariates that were correlated to the timing of elections interacted with year fixed effects.
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Next, I discuss the possibility that the increases in public good provision were driven by changes in the age of the village head. First, note that the regressions presented in Appendix Table 14 indicate that, while the age of the village heads decreases on average after the first election post-1992, the decline is not associated to the intensity of the INPRES program. This supports the use of the interaction of the post dummy and the intensity of the INPRES program as an instrument for the education of the village head, since it is uncorrelated to the age of the village head.
Nevertheless, I implement an additional robustness check where I incorporate the age of the village head as a regressor in the baseline econometric specification of interest. Appendix Tables 19.A and 19.B presents the results. The first column for each outcome variable reproduces the baseline 2SLS reported in Table 7 when restricted to the sample for which age of the village head is reported. The second column includes age as an exogenous regressor to the 2SLS specification. Although the age regressor is statistically significant for primary care facilities and doctors, incorporating this regressor does not affect the results of the interaction terms.
58 The third column includes age and age interacted with poor quality of the corresponding public goods at baseline as endogenous regressors. In order to increase the strength of the first stage, I include as instruments the average age and education of village heads in neighboring villages. The coefficients on years of education and its interaction with bad service are robust to this alternative specification, while the coefficients on age and its interaction are small in magnitude and statistically insignificant.
57 Appendix Table 22 shows that the results related to health services are robust to alternative measures of demand for public goods. In particular, I show that more educated village heads generate larger increases in the availability of health services in villages that have a high mortality rate at baseline.
58 Also, note that results suggest that, if anything, older village heads deliver more public goods. Since age and years of education are inversely correlated the exclusion of age as a regressor downward bias the estimates. Hence, the baseline results should be considered a lower bound on the effect of education on public good provision.
Overall, these results suggest that changes in the age of the village head are unlikely to account for the observed results. Given the similarity of the 2SLS point estimates in both specification, I focus on the main specification. Notes : Summary statistics of the village budget of 1996 corresponding to 9,855 villages.
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Appendix Notes: Robust Standard errors, clustered at the district level, in parenthesis. Each column restricts the sample to a subset of villages that held elections during the years shown in the column heading. The unit of observation is the village-year level. The dependent variable is defined by the column headings. The years included in all regressions are 1986, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2003 , except for access to safe water which is not reported for years 2000 and 2003. All regressions include village and year fixed effects. The post-treatment point estimates and standard errors are in bold to facilitate the reading of the table. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Notes: Robust Standard errors, clustered at the district level, in parenthesis. Each column restricts the sample to a subset of villages that held elections during the years shown in the column heading. The unit of observation is the village-year level. The dependent variable is defined by the column headings. The years included in all regressions are 1986, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2003 , except for access to safe water which is not reported for years 2000 and 2003. All regressions include village and year fixed effects. The post-treatment point estimates and standard errors are in bold to facilitate the reading of the table. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. 1986, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2003 , except for number of health posts which is not reported for years 1986 and 1996. § The number of INPRES schools is defined in deviations from its sample mean. The number of observations varies because of missing values in the dependent variables. All regressions control for village fixed effects and year fixed effects.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Number of Health Posts Garbage Disposal
Appendix 1986, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2003 , except for number of health posts which is not reported for years 1986 and 1996. In the odd columns the measure of INPRES school intensity used corresponds to the number of INPRES schools in deviations from its sample mean. In even columns the intensity measure corresponds to a dummy for any INPRES schools constructed in the village. In columns 1 and 2 bad baseine service equals 1 for villages with no health post in year 1990. In columns 3 and 4 bad baseine service equals 1 for villages with no access to garbage bin disposal in year 1986. The number of observations varies because of missing values in the dependent variables. All regressions control for village fixed effects and year fixed effects.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Number of Health Posts Garbage Disposal Dependent Variables:
Appendix Table 6 . Robustness Checks of the Effects of School Construction on Public Goods (Additional Outcomes) 1986, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2003, except 1986, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2003, except 1986, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2003 , except for number of health posts which is not reported for years 1986 and 1996. § The number of INPRES schools is defined in deviations from its sample mean. The number of observations varies because of missing values in the dependent variables. All regressions control for village fixed effects and year fixed effects. Additional controls are included as shown in the table.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. 1986, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2003 , except for access to safe water which is not reported for years 2000 and 2003 . § The number of INPRES schools is defined in deviations from its sample mean. The number of observations varies because of missing values in the dependent variables. All regressions control for village fixed effects, year fixed effects and province fixed effects interacted with year fixed effects.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. 1986, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2003 , except for number of health posts which is not reported for years 1986 and 1996. § The number of INPRES schools is defined in deviations from its sample mean. The number of observations varies because of missing values in the dependent variables. All regressions control for village fixed effects and year fixed effects.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. 1986, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2003 . The number of observations varies because of missing values in the dependent variables. All regressions control for village fixed effects and year fixed effects.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Notes : Panel A reproduces summary statistics of the main dataset used in the paper. Panel B provides summary statistics for data collected through online searches on characteristics of candidates of village elections for 38 villages.
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Appendix Notes : Robust Standard errors, clustered at the district level, in parenthesis. The sample includes 82 districts. The unit of observation is the village-year level. The sample includes 9,855 villages. The dependent variable is the numer age of the village head in office in the corresponding village. § The number of INPRES schools is defined in deviations from its sample mean. The years included in all regressions are 1986, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2003 . All regressions control for village fixed effects and year fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Notes : Robust Standard errors, clustered at the district level, in parenthesis. The sample includes 82 districts. The unit of observation is the village-year level. The sample includes 9,855 villages. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes value one if the village head is a male. § The number of INPRES schools is defined in deviations from its sample mean. The years included in all regressions are 1986, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2003 . All regressions control for village fixed effects and year fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. Notes : Robust Standard errors, clustered at the district level, in parenthesis. The sample includes 82 districts and 9,855 villages. The unit of observation is the village-year level. The dependent variable is defined by the column headings. The years included in all regressions are 1986, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2003, except 1986, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2003, except 1986, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2003 , except for number of health posts which is not reported for years 1986 and 1996. The number of observations varies because of missing values in the dependent variables. In columns 2, and 6 the instrumental variables corresponds to the interaction of the post 1st election after 1992 dummy with the number of INPRES schools in the village. In columns 4 and 8 the set of instrumental variables also includes the post dummy interacted with bad service at baseline and the triple interaction with the number of INPRES schools. All regressions control for village fixed effects and year fixed effects. The 2SLS estimates also include the post 1st election after 1992 dummy as a covariate.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. 1986, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2003 , except for access to safe water which is not reported for years 2000 and 2003. The number of observations varies because of missing values in the dependent variables. In columns 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, and 8 the instrumental variables corresponds to the interaction of the post 1st election after 1992 dummy with the number of INPRES schools, the post dummy interacted with bad service at baseline and the triple interaction of the three variables. Columns 3, 6, and 9 also include as instrument the average age and education of village heads in neighboring villages. All regressions control for village fixed effects, year fixed effects and the post 1st election after 1992 dummy.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. 1986, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2003 , except for number of health posts which is not reported for years 1986 and 1996. The number of observations varies because of missing values in the dependent variables. In columns 1, 2, 4, and 5, the instrumental variables corresponds to the post 1st election after 1992 dummy interacted with the number of INPRES schools, the post dummy interacted with bad service at baseline and the triple interaction of the three variables. Columns 3 and 6 also include as instrument the average age and education of village heads in neighboring villages. All regressions control for village fixed effects, year fixed effects, and the post 1st election after 1992 dummy.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1
Cragg-Donald F-Stat Notes : Robust Standard errors, clustered at the district level, in parenthesis. The sample includes 82 districts and 9,855 villages. The unit of observation is the village-year level. The dependent variable is defined by the column headings. The years included in all regressions are 1986, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2003, except 1986, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2003 , except for access to safe water which is not reported for years 2000 and 2003 and number of health posts which is not reported in years 1986 and 1996. The number of observations varies because of missing values in the dependent variables. In the odd columns the instrumental variables corresponds to the post 1st election after 1992 dummy and its interaction of with the number of INPRES schools in the village. In the even columns the set of instrumental variables also includes the post dummy interacted with bad service at baseline and the triple interaction with the number of INPRES schools. All regressions control for village fixed effects and year fixed effects.*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. 1986, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000 and 2003 , except for number of health posts which is not reported in years 1986 and 1996. The number of observations varies because of missing values in the dependent variables. In columns 2, 4, and 6 the instrumental variables corresponds to interaction of the post 1st election after 1992 dummy with the number of INPRES schools, the post dummy interacted with high mortality at baseline at baseline and the triple interaction of the three variables. All regressions control for village fixed effects and year fixed effects. Columns 2, 4, and 6 also add the post 1st election after 1992 dummy as a covariate. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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